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Through the Eyes of Jurors:
The Use of Schemas in the Application of
“Plain-Language” Jury Instructions
Sara Gordon*
“Through the Eyes of Jurors” is the first law journal article to consider all of the major
cognitive psychology studies that examine how “schemas,” or the preexisting notions
jurors have about the law, shape jurors’ use of jury instructions, even when those jurors
are given “plain-language” instructions. This Article examines the social science research
on schema theory in order to advance our understanding of how schemas continue to
influence jurors’ use of jury instructions, even when those jurors are given “plain
language” instructions.
A significant body of legal literature has examined jurors’ use and understanding of jury
instructions, and many scholars have recommended methods to improve juror
comprehension of instructions. This Article takes that analysis a step further, and argues
that even when given “plain-language” jury instructions, jurors will still be influenced by
their preconceived ideas of what the “law” is—in other words, by the preexisting schemas
they have for legal concepts. Furthermore, these schemas are often legally incorrect, and
findings from the social sciences suggest that—even when given plain-language jury
instructions with the correct legal standard—jurors may still apply these legally
inappropriate schemas. This Article synthesizes the results and underlying theories
derived from those findings in order to examine the impact these schemas have on jury
decisionmaking, and on jurors’ use of jury instructions, and to identify ways lawyers and
judges can counteract inappropriate existing schemas and activate legally appropriate
schemas before jurors are introduced to the facts they are expected to interpret.
Specifically, courts should use principles of cognitive and educational psychology to
develop jurors’ schemas for the applicable legal concepts to make their schemas better
organized and therefore more accessible. Such schemas would allow for more thoughtful
judgment and better, more accurate decisionmaking.
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Introduction
Assume that you serving on a jury deciding a capital case. The
defendant, John Smith, is on trial for murder. You are satisfied that the
evidence has established guilt, but you must also recommend a sentence.
You have two options: the death penalty and life without parole. You
know what “death penalty” means, but what about “life without parole”?
Does it mean exactly what it says—that under no circumstances will
Smith ever be released? Or might he be released anyway, perhaps for
demonstrating good behavior in prison or if the prison becomes
overcrowded? The jury instruction does not answer the question, so you
are left to your own preexisting understanding. Your answer may be a
matter of life or death for Smith because you may think that the only way
to protect the public from future danger is to impose the death penalty.
In fact, even if a jury instruction assures you that a sentence of life
without parole means that Smith will never be freed, cognitive research
indicates that you may still choose death in order to prevent future danger.
In other words, you may continue to adhere to your preexisting idea even
if a jury instruction clearly and directly sets out a different answer. Thus,
there is a lot at stake when we study the effectiveness of jury instructions.
In the past several decades, much of the social science research on
juries has focused on jurors’ ability to remember, understand, and apply
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the judge’s instructions correctly, and studies have almost universally
returned results finding that, by and large, jurors are confused by jury
1
instructions and often disregard them. In one empirical study of juror
confusion, researchers tested the extent to which jurors understood
pattern jury instructions commonly used in civil and criminal cases and
found that the jurors understood less than half the content of the tested
2
instructions. Because of this lack of jury understanding, much of the
literature about jury instructions has focused on ways to improve juror
comprehension. Among other suggested reforms, scholars have
encouraged the use of psycholinguistic principles to rewrite instructions
to improve vocabulary, syntax, and organization to make the instructions
3
simpler and more comprehensible to jurors.
1. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy:
Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 788 (2000); Amiram Elwork
et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 Law & Hum. Behav. 163 (1977);
David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478
(1976).
2. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 77, 78 (1988). For an extensive collection of cases documenting juror
misunderstanding, see id. at 79–83. In a study designed to learn the extent to which jurors referred to
the instructions during deliberations, the authors discovered that most jurors try to use the instructions
but are often confused by their meaning. Id. at 78. In that study, people called for jury service watched
a videotaped reenactment of a murder trial; 25% of the jurors’ deliberations cited material from the
instructions, and jurors made seven incorrect statements about the meaning of the judge’s instructions,
only one of which was corrected by other jurors. Id. at 84 (citing Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury
(1983)). In another study by Strawn and Buchanan, 116 people summoned for jury service but not
chosen for a jury were divided into two groups. Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 480. One group
heard a twenty-five minute videotape of instructions in a burglary case. Id. Even after hearing the
instructions, however, many of these jurors either misunderstood or did not accept certain instructions.
Id. Despite instructions to the contrary, 43% believed that circumstantial evidence was of no value,
and 23% believed that when faced with equal evidence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, the
defendant should be convicted. Id. at 481. Jurors also misunderstood words in the instructions; only
51% understood the word “demeanor.” Id. at 481–82.
3. Psycholinguistics applies the theories of experimental psychology to the problems of language
processing and comprehension. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1306, 1308 (1979);
see Elwork et al., supra note 1, at 165–69; Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science
Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 589, 623–27 (1997). Other
commonly proposed reforms have focused on encouraging active participation by jurors by allowing
jurors to take notes and ask questions of the courts and witnesses. See, e.g., Council for Court
Excellence District of Columbia Jury Project, Juries for the Year 2000 and Beyond: Proposals
to Improve the Jury Systems in Washington, D.C. (1998); The Honorable B. Michael Dann,
“Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 Ind. L.J.
1229, 1251–56 (1993). Several studies have examined the impact of allowing jurors to take notes and to
ask questions. Jurors will generally take notes when given the opportunity, and one study found that
jurors who took notes felt they participated more during deliberation. Victor E. Flango, Would Jurors
Do a Better Job if They Could Take Notes?, 63 Judicature 436, 442 (1980); Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking,
79 Judicature 256, 258 (1996). Jurors who were allowed to ask questions generally asked three or
fewer questions and focused on the definition of key legal terms. Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth
F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions,
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Less attention has been paid, however, to why jurors are not always
4
guided by even the clearest jury instructions. A large part of the answer
may be the power of a juror’s own “preconstructions, preferred meanings,
5
rhetorical and ideological dimensions.” The purpose of this Article is to
examine the impact these preconstructions, or “schemas,” have on jury
decisionmaking and on jurors’ use of jury instructions, and to identify
ways lawyers and judges can both counteract inappropriate existing
schemas and activate legally appropriate schemas before jurors are
introduced to the facts they are expected to interpret.
Specifically, I recommend that courts use principles of cognitive and
educational psychology to develop jurors’ schemas for the relevant legal
concepts to make those schemas more flexible and better organized, and
therefore allow for more accurate and more efficient decisionmaking.
This prescription balances the competing goals of maintaining juries that
represent a reasonable cross section of their communities (a jury of
peers), and of ensuring that those jurors are prepared and competent to
analyze the law and facts that they will encounter in a trial. Because
jurors are legal novices, they view and interpret both the law and the
6
facts differently than lawyers and judges, and most jury instructions do
not do enough to help jurors compensate for this lack of expertise or
develop appropriate schemas for legal concepts—especially given the
time constraints imposed by a typical trial. Moreover, because they are
7
typically drafted by lawyers (or committees of lawyers) who are already
legal experts, the instructions are often not drafted with novices in mind
or using principles that will best ensure novices fully comprehend the
law.
I propose that the goal of jury instructions should be two-fold: first, to
give jurors the applicable law, and second, to help jurors correct existing
schemas and develop new and legally correct schemas before they are
exposed to the evidence in a trial. Although it would be impossible—and
contrary to the idea of a representative jury—to bring jurors’ legal
knowledge to the level of lawyers and judges in such a short period of
time, the instructions can incorporate principles of educational psychology
to help jurors develop new schemas efficiently and therefore maximize
learning. Moreover, these reworked instructions should be given to jurors
17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 153, 170–71 (1982). It is less clear whether note taking and asking questions
influence juror comprehension of the instructions.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis
204 (1987).
6. See Fleurie Nievelstein et al., Expertise-Related Differences in Conceptual and Ontological
Knowledge in the Legal Domain, 20 Eur. J. Cognitive Psychol. 1043 (2008); see also discussion infra
Part IV.A.
7. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012); Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the
Language of Jury Instructions, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1081, 1085 (2001).
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before the introduction of evidence. This will assist jurors in developing
appropriate schemas for the legal concepts at issue before they are asked
to apply those concepts to the facts in the trial.
Part I of this Article first discusses the use of jury instructions, as well
as the role of schemas, in how people view, interpret, and remember
information. Once established, schemas influence what information people
notice and how they interpret that information. Jurors are therefore
usually unable to separate existing schemas (which may or may not be
8
legally correct) from their use and application of jury instructions. This
Part also discusses the difference between expert schemas (those held by
lawyers and judges) and novice schemas (those typically held by jurors).
Part II reviews the social science literature on how schemas affect jurors’
use of both pattern jury instructions and instructions rewritten according
to psycholinguistic principles. Part III then discusses the importance of the
representative jury (a jury of peers) in the American legal system. This
Article does not suggest that we should abandon that system in favor of
the use of “special juries” of experts, but instead recommends that courts
help lay juries develop expertise in the applicable law in order to create
legally appropriate schemas. Finally, Part IV recommends methods to
correct jurors’ existing schemas and develop new schemas that are better
organized and more accessible, allowing for more thoughtful judgment and
better, more uniform decisionmaking. Educational psychology principles
inform this discussion and help illuminate how to more efficiently teach
jurors to use relevant legal concepts and overcome schema perseverance.

I. Jury Instructions and Schemas
Jury instructions play an important role in all stages of the trial
process. These instructions are generally culled from the applicable
9
statutes and case law and drafted by attorneys or advisory committees.
Instructions tell jurors about the applicable law and give them a
mechanism with which to interpret the facts they have seen in a trial:
Instructions are meant to ensure uniformity in verdicts and are typically
given at the beginning of a trial, as needed throughout the trial, and at the
10
end of closing arguments. Jurors are generally given the most extensive
instructions at the end of a trial—including a recitation of the applicable
11
law and how that law should apply to the facts. Instructions, therefore,
8. See generally Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 180–81 (1984).
9. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012); Tiersma, supra note 7, at 1084.
10. Different types of instructions address the different things the jury is asked to consider. Some
instructions tell jurors how to evaluate evidence and weigh the credibility of witnesses, some explain
the burden of proof, and others provide definitions and elements of crimes or claims. Neil Vidmar &
Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 161 (2007).
11. Although there are few laws regulating the use and timing of instructions, the judge’s
authority to manage a trial effectively allows for instructions at any point. Neil P. Cohen, The Timing
of Jury Instructions, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 681, 684 (2000). As Cohen notes, Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of
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are the crucial link between how a juror perceives and understands the
facts they are told and how they use those facts to reach a verdict, but
jurors do not typically receive these guiding principles until after they
12
have seen the evidence. When jurors do finally receive instructions, they
are often full of language taken from statutes and cases that may have
different meanings to the lawyers who wrote the instructions than they
do to the jurors who are being asked to use them. While they may be
written plainly, they do not generally offer much guidance to jurors
about how to apply them to the facts they have just heard in order to
reach a decision.
Several models attempt to explain how jurors use the facts and law to
come to a decision, and most recognize that jurors rely to some extent on
their understanding of how the world works in reaching a decision about
the facts. The most prominent of these is the story model of juror
decisionmaking that suggests that in order to make sense of all of the
evidence they are asked to evaluate, jurors construct a story of what they
13
think happened. In this model, jurors use instructions to derive lists of
the features of individual crimes or claims. If the story they have
constructed shares enough features with the instructions, they will find
the defendant guilty, and if it is missing too many requirements, they will
14
find the defendant innocent.
Even with this model as a guide, however, it can still be difficult to
determine precisely how jurors are using jury instructions to interpret the
facts because the rules of evidence generally limit inquiry into the validity
15
of jurors’ decisionmaking processes. As noted above, several studies
have shown improved comprehension of plain-language jury instructions,

Criminal Procedure gives the judge discretion to “instruct the jury before or after argument, or both,”
and Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the court to “instruct the jury before or
after the arguments are completed or at both times.” Id. at 686. Some studies have examined the
benefit of providing jurors with instructions at the beginning and the end of a trial—instead of only at
the end—in order to provide jurors with a cognitive framework of the law and help them to better
retain and understand the evidence. One study showed that the timing of the instruction produced
modest improvement in juror comprehension but did not improve recall of evidence or affect the
jury’s verdict. See Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with
Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 409, 424–26 (1989).
12. Imagine you were asked to make chocolate chip cookies and given a list of ingredients to mix
together and, only once you had done that, were you told the precise amount of each ingredient to use,
as well as the order in which you should add them to the batter. This is how jurors, ignorant of the
precise technicalities of the law and the elements of claims, may experience their role at a standard
trial. They know generally what the claim or crime is that they are being asked to consider, but have
not been taught its basic principles or given any guidance about how to consider the vast amounts of
evidence they will hear at the trial.
13. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 519–20 (1991).
14. Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension of
Jury Instructions, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 381, 382 (1997).
15. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
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but this alone does not tell us the extent to which jurors rely on those
new instructions, or the extent to which they use some combination of
the instructions and other factors in reaching a decision about the facts.
Studies suggest it is almost certainly the latter. In addition to the
instructions they receive, some jurors might also rely on their opinions of
16
17
the lawyers or be swayed by strong opinions voiced by fellow jurors.
Others might make a decision based on their “gut.” But what all of them
are probably doing, whether they know it (and most probably do not), is
using schemas to interpret and make sense of the information they have
heard during the trial to help them come to a verdict.
A “schema” is a cognitive framework or concept that helps
18
individuals organize and interpret information. For example, a schema
for a party would contain ideas that are true about parties in most cases:
Parties are social events where people come together to have fun and
often involve drinking, eating, talking, and dancing. If someone were to
attend a party, this schema would be used as a general framework that
would shape their expectations of the event and guide their behavior
19
once they were there. Similarly, while all trees are different from each
other and possess a variety of different characteristics (different colors,
shapes, numbers of branches), we can easily recognize a type of tree we
have never encountered before as a tree because we have a schema for
trees.
Schemas are a type of cognitive shortcut—we rely on them to
organize information and our past experiences so we can better and more

16. Adam Trahan & Daniel M. Stewart, Examining Capital Jurors’ Impressions of Attorneys’
Personal Characteristics and Their Impact on Sentencing Outcomes, 7 Applied Psychol. Crim. Just. 93,
99 (2011) (noting that jurors in capital trials form impressions of attorneys based on physical
characteristics, such as attractiveness, hygiene, and dress, and that these impressions have some
influence on sentencing decisions); see id. at 102 (“Jurors who formed negative impressions of the
defense attorneys were more likely to sentence their clients to death than those who reacted favorably
toward the defense counsel.”).
17. Mark Costanzo, Psychology Applied to Law 151 (2004) (noting potential jurors judged to
be “strong” are more often well educated and articulate and have a higher occupational status than
their fellow potential jurors); see Samuel H. Solomon, How Jurors Make Decisions, DOAR Litigation
Consulting 5 (May 2012) (noting that jurors often look to other jurors with “perceived or real subject
matter expertise,” and advising attorneys to explore the backgrounds of jurors who might have such
expertise and to address them subtly during the trial).
18. See discussion infra Part I.
19. Martha Augoustinos & Iain Walker, Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction 33
(1995). Definitions for schemas are varied. Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor describe a schema as “a
cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus,”
Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 140, while Reid Hastie defines schemas broadly to include “almost
any of the abstract hypotheses, expectations, organizing principles, frames, implicational molecules,
scripts, plans, or prototypes that have been proposed as abstract mental organizing systems or memory
structures.” Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in 1 Social Cognition: The
Ontario Symposium 39, 39 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981). Moreover, some scholars also use the
term “knowledge structures” to refer to schemas. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1046.
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efficiently understand new experiences. Schemas can be quite useful
because they allow us to quickly interpret vast amounts of information and
21
help us deal with confusing, missing, or unknown information. However,
these frameworks can also influence what information we notice (we tend
to notice information that fits into existing schemas and ignore that which
does not), as well as what information we remember (we similarly tend
to remember information that is consistent with established schemas and
22
have more difficulty recalling that which is not). Of course, schemas can
also be rigid or based on incomplete information and, in these
23
circumstances, might require reassessment.
The process of schema development begins in early childhood. As
we encounter things for the first time, we integrate the new information,
activity, or concept into our memory by incorporating it into our
24
schemas. A schema, therefore, represents an individual’s accumulated
knowledge, beliefs, and experiences. Once developed, schemas are
available for application to new situations, and this application process is
25
automatic. We do not see a furry object with four legs and a tail, we see
a cat; the cat schema is automatically activated by incoming information.
This process occurs unintentionally and unconsciously, and the process
26
does not interfere with other mental activity. Schemas therefore allow us
to process information efficiently: Because we know what to expect, we do
not have to approach each person or situation we encounter as completely
novel. As Fiske and Taylor note, the “most fundamental principle
suggested by schema research is that people simplify reality; they do so in
27
part by interpreting specific instances in light of the general case.”
Before one can understand the significant impact that schemas have
on jurors’ use of instructions, it is important to briefly recap the different
types of schemas, as well as how people use them to interpret
information. People have schemas for everything, including themselves,
other people, the roles people play in society, and different types of
28
events or activities. Furthermore, both priming and framing influence
29
which schemas will be activated and applied in any given situation.
20. Dorothy G. Singer & Tracey A. Revenson, A Piaget Primer: How a Child Thinks 17 (1978).
21. Augoustinos & Walker, supra note 19, at 32–33.
22. See generally Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 180–81.
23. Augoustinos & Walker, supra note 19, at 33. A stereotype is a type of schema, in that it
organizes information about a particular group. Id. at 208; see infra note 38 (on stereotypes).
24. Singer & Revenson, supra note 20, at 17.
25. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Problem Solving, Decision Making, and
Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers and Policy Makers 18 (2010).
26. Id. at 18.
27. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 141.
28. Id. at 149.
29. Id. at 175. Priming is the idea that more recently and frequently activated ideas will come
more easily to mind, while framing refers to the ways in which speakers shape messages for listeners.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
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Once established, schemas persevere, sometimes even in the face of
30
conflicting or contradictory information. Finally, as legal novices, jurors
often have undeveloped or incorrect schemas for the legal concepts they
are asked to apply in a typical trial.
A. Different Types of Schemas: Self, Person, Role, and Event
Most social science research focuses on four main categories of
schemas: self schemas (information about one’s own personality,
appearance, and behavior), person schemas (information about the traits
and goals of others), role schemas (information about the role someone
plays in society, such as age, race, sex, or profession), and event schemas
or scripts (information about what usually happens in a particular setting
31
or event). All of these schemas influence and guide how we perceive,
32
remember, and make inferences about new information.
How a person sees herself and what she feels her personality is
33
depends on her self-schema—the beliefs and ideas she has about herself.
People are either schematic or aschematic on particular attributes or
34
personality dimensions. If an attribute is important to someone, or she
thinks of herself as embodying strong components of that trait (“I am very
political” or “I am outgoing”), she is said to be schematic as to that
attribute. Conversely, if the person does not have a strong view of herself
with regard to a particular trait, or it is less important to her (“Being
athletic is not important to me—I don’t think about it one way or
another”), then she is aschematic as to a particular trait. Like other
schemas, once formed, self schemas are resistant to change.
Unlike self schemas, person schemas organize our knowledge about
other people. Person schemas are generally broken down into personality
traits and goals, both of which determine what information is relevant to a
35
given person or type of person. For example, a schema for the trait
“brave” might include what brave people do (charge into burning buildings)
and examples of brave people (police officers, World War II resistance
fighters). Goal schemas are a joint function of the goals dictated by a
specific situation and how those possible goals fit the particular person in
36
the situation.
Role schemas organize our knowledge about the roles people play
in society and our expectations for appropriate behavior based on those

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 171.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 452 (1999).
Id. at 453.
Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 150.
Id.

652

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:643

37

roles. For example, someone would expect her accountant to ask to see
a copy of her prior tax returns, but she would be surprised if her doctor
made the same request; conversely, she would be shocked if her
accountant attempted to take her temperature. The characteristics that
shape role schemas can develop through the effort or achievement of the
individual (such as a person’s experience or profession), or through
immutable characteristics (such as race, sex, or age). All of these
characteristics have corresponding role-based expectations for appropriate
38
behavior, organized in the observer’s mind as role schemas.
Event schemas, also known as scripts, are structures that describe the
appropriate or expected sequence of events in well-known situations like a
39
visit to a doctor’s office, a restaurant, or a sporting event. These schemas
contain beliefs about the sequence of actions and events that typically
occur in particular situations; they allow us to abstract procedures and
complex sequences of behaviors from our everyday experiences and apply
40
those to our understanding of new experiences. In one study designed
to determine if there were widely shared scripts for different types of
robberies, subjects were asked to write a list of actions describing a
41
typical act of a robbery of a convenience store. Ninety-six percent
included “enter store,” 90% included “look around (once in store),” 90%
included “go to the cash register,” 99% included “demand money,” and
42
96% included “exit store.” A majority of the subjects in the study
therefore held similar beliefs about the sequence of actions that typically
occurred in a convenience store robbery.
The research on schemas—whether self, person, role, or event—
indicates they all affect our perception of new information, our inferences
based on that information, and our memories and retrieval of stored
43
information. Schemas “guide our information seeking. Not only do
44
schema[s] tell us what to see, but they also tell us where to see it.” We
do not notice or attend to all of the information we encounter, but only
37. Id. at 159.
38. Id. at 160. A stereotype is a type of role schema, one that comprises our knowledge, beliefs,
and expectations about a particular social group. David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman,
Stereotypes, in Handbook of Social Cognition 168 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d
ed. 1994). Social stereotypes exist for all groups, not just racial minorities, and correspond to the
beliefs and expectations we have about particular groups. We have role schemas and stereotypes for
teachers, gang members, ball players, religious fundamentalists, and politicians. Once a person is
categorized, she becomes another example of the schema and is assigned the characteristics and traits
of others within her same social group. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 161.
39. Jean Matter Mandler, Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Schema Theory 75 (1984).
40. Id.
41. Valerie Fisher Holst & Kathy Pezdek, Scripts for Typical Crimes and Their Effects on
Memory for Eyewitness Testimony, 6 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 573, 578–79 (1992).
42. Id.
43. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 150.
44. David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in Handbook of Social Cognition,
supra note 38, at 161, 179–80.

April 2013]

SCHEMAS IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

653

deal with that which is important or useful, and schemas tell us what is
45
important or useful. Next, schemas allow us to draw inferences about
46
what happened in the past and what is likely to happen in the future.
Finally, schemas help determine what we remember about what happens
around us. We are more likely to remember schema-relevant or schemaconsistent information and to disregard that which does not fit into an
47
existing schema.
B. Schema Activation: Priming and Framing
After schemas have developed, they are available for use in new
48
situations, existing in a sort of resting state, waiting to be cued. But what
determines which of the many relevant and available schemas will be
activated in a particular situation? When meeting a new co-worker, a
person could characterize her as a Southerner, a professor, a woman, or a
colleague. Although she may be all of these things, a variety of factors
influence the schemas that will be activated and applied when the person
meets the new co-worker, among them the recency with which a schema
has been activated in the past and the frequency with which it has been
49
activated (the priming effect). Likewise, the way in which the encounter
50
has been framed also influences what schemas are activated.
Priming has a powerful influence on which schemas are activated in
particular situations. Ideas that have been recently and frequently
51
activated will be more easily recalled than those that have not. Similarly,
schema activation is determined partly by how recently or frequently a
52
particular schema has been activated in the past. Moreover, once a
schema is activated, or “primed,” for one purpose, it becomes more
accessible, and its likelihood of being used in the interpretation and
53
organization of subsequent information is similarly increased. If the
person in the previous paragraph had watched Gone With the Wind on
television the night before, for example, she would be more likely to
characterize her new colleague as a Southerner, in addition to
characterizing her as a professor.

45. Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in 1
Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium 89, 90 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981).
46. Id. at 97–98.
47. Id. at 98.
48. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 175.
49. Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the
Interpretation of Information About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. Personality
& Soc. Psychol. 1660, 1661 (1979); see Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 181.
50. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 181.
51. Id. at 231.
52. Id. at 181.
53. Srull & Wyer, supra note 49, at 1661–62.
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Exposure to words, people, or physical objects can activate schemas,
54
even without the perceiver’s conscious awareness. In one study, subjects
believed they were participating in a sentence scrambling exercise.
Subjects were first told to ask the experimenter for a second task after
55
they had completed the sentence scramble. Researchers then primed the
subjects with words associated with being “rude” (such as “aggressively,”
“disturb,” “intrude,” “obnoxious,” and “bluntly”), words associated with
being “polite” (such as “respect,” “unobtrusively,” “cordially,” and
“behave”), or neutral words (such as “send,” “clear,” “gives,” “flawlessly,”
56
and “practiced”). After subjects completed the sentence scramble,
researchers measured how many seconds it took the subjects to interrupt a
conversation between the experimenter and a confederate and ask for
57
the second task. The subjects exposed to the rude priming conditions
interrupted significantly faster (averaging 326 seconds) than the
58
participants in the polite (558 seconds) or neutral (519 seconds) groups.
In a similar study, participants exposed to words related to the elderly
(such as “Florida,” “bingo,” and “retired”) were timed walking to the
59
elevator after completing the sentence scramble. They walked more
slowly than those participants who had been exposed to neutral words
60
(such as “thirsty,” “clean,” and “private”). The words, therefore,
activated schemas that in turn actually influenced the behavior of the
subjects.
Like priming, the framing of information activates schemas that
influence the categories we apply and the inferences and decisions we
make. “Framing is the process by which a communication source
61
constructs and defines a social or political issue for its audience.”

54. Brest & Krieger, supra note 25, at 315. Of course, listeners can be primed by more than one
message. If a listener is more influenced by the first message she hears, this is the result of the primacy
effect; if instead, the listener is more influenced by the second, different message, this is the result of
the recency effect. Curtis P. Haugtvedt & Duane T. Wegener, Message Order Effects in Persuasion: An
Attitude Strength Perspective, 21 J. Consumer Res. 205, 205 (1994). In studies measuring the point in a
trial at which jurors are most influenced by incriminating evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the results
have been mixed, with some studies finding a larger primacy effect, and others a more significant
recency effect. Kristi A. Costabile & Stanley B. Klein, Finishing Strong: Recency Effects in Juror
Judgments, 27 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 47, 56 (2005). It does seem that the recency effect might
slightly outweigh the primacy effect—in other words, jurors are more likely to be influenced by
information they hear most recently—though this could be due to the jurors’ ability to remember that
information because they heard it most recently. Id. at 56.
55. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 230, 234 (1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 236.
60. Id.
61. Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 Pol. Behav. 221, 221
(1997).
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Cognitive linguist George Lakoff offers a definition that is closer to a
traditional definition of schemas, describing frames as “the mental
structures that allow human beings to understand reality—and
62
sometimes to create what we take to be reality.” People use frames to
understand the facts they encounter; as Lakoff notes, facts “need a
63
context.” Frames help contextualize and influence our understanding of
everything from social institutions (in a frame for a local school board,
there are elected officials who make important decisions about
educational policy) to individual words (“pro-choice” or “pro-life”). The
activation of a particular frame can predispose people to particular
64
preferences and decisions.
Frames also help shape and define issues. “An issue-defining frame
characterizes the problem, assigns blame, and constrains the possible
solutions. . . . [Frames] block relevant concerns if those concerns are
65
outside of the frame.” Is it a “war on terror” or a “war for oil”? Framing
played a big role in shaping public opinion over the Obama
Administration’s proposed rule requiring religiously affiliated
organizations’ insurance companies to pay for free birth control for those
organizations’ employees. In one national poll, when asked if employers
should be required to offer free birth control to employees, respondents
66
favored the rule by a margin of 53% to 33%. But when the same
respondents were asked whether the government should mandate that
the Catholic Church and other religiously affiliated hospitals and colleges
offer birth control paid for by the institutions’ insurance companies,
67
respondents opposed the rule by a margin of 45% to 38%. In other
words, when the issue was framed as one of access to birth control,
respondents approved of the rule, but they disapproved of the same rule
68
when it was framed as an attack on religious freedom.
62. George Lakoff, Thinking Points: Communicating Our American Values and Vision 25
(2006); see Danielle Kie Hart, In a Word, 41 Sw. L. Rev. 215, 217 (2012) (“A ‘frame’ is variously
defined as: a structured understanding[] of the way aspects of the world function[,] an interpretive
schema that enable[s] individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life
space and the world at large[,] a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and
suggesting what is at issue[,] and a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning; it
suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue[.] At its most basic, therefore, a ‘frame’
is a tool that enables people to make sense of the world around them.” (alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Lakoff, supra note 62, at 10.
64. James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 23 Pol.
Behav. 225, 228–29 (2001) (discussing Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment, in which subjects
changed their preferences for an identical program to combat a disease by 50% depending on whether
the program was framed in terms of saving lives or the number of people dying).
65. Lakoff, supra note 62, at 31–32.
66. Gerald F. Seib, Birth-Control Rule Debate Intensifying, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303717304577279831635250306.html.
67. Id.
68. My own use of the words “access” and “attack” in this sentence further frame the issue.
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The framing of an issue can constrain people’s abilities to solve
problems, and jurors are just as susceptible to this effect as anyone else.
As Brest and Krieger note, a “particular frame inevitably provides only
one of a number of possible views of reality and implicitly blocks the
69
consideration of alternative perspectives with other possible solutions.”
The problem, as the authors describe it, is that the decisionmaker thinks
she is seeing all sides of the problem because the frame itself “is often
invisible: You have the illusion that you’re seeing the world ‘just as it is,’
70
and it is difficult to imagine that there could be another way to view it.”
C. The Perseverance Effect, Confirmation Bias, and Biased
Assimilation
Schemas are resilient; once formed, people’s beliefs about themselves,
others, and the things they see in the world are often unaffected—or only
71
slightly affected—by logical challenges. This is known as the
“perseverance effect”: Schemas help us process information more
efficiently, and that benefit would be lost if people changed their schemas
72
to fit every new situation. Once schemas are established, they persist,
often in the face of evidence to the contrary or explicit instructions to
disregard them, and there even appears to be a biological basis for this
73
perseverance effect.
In fact, schemas persevere even when people are told the evidence
74
in support of the schema is false. In a study demonstrating this effect,
subjects were asked to review two suicide notes and determine which one
75
was real and which was fake. After completing the task, the subjects
were given false feedback: Irrespective of actual performance, some were
told they had performed much better than average, while others were
76
told they performed the same as, or worse than average. The subjects
were then “debriefed,” at which point it “was carefully explained that
their putative performance had been determined before they entered the
69. Brest & Krieger, supra note 25, at 35.
70. Id. In discussing the effect of frames on outcomes, the authors describe an experiment where
American college students, Israeli pilots, and their flying instructors played a Prisoner’s Dilemma type
game, where participants choose whether to participate or defect. Those who were told the exercise
was a “Wall Street Game” were more likely to defect than those who were told it was “Community
Game.” Id. (citing Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 Personality & Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 1175, 1175–85 (2004)).
71. Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques in the
Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 Soc. Cognition 126, 126 (1982).
72. Id. at 127.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 102–108.
74. Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional
Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 880, 880 (1975).
75. Id. at 882.
76. Id.
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experiment, that they had received feedback unrelated to their actual
performance, and that the deception had been necessary in terms of the
77
purported rationale for the study.” Despite this thorough debriefing,
subjects who were initially told they performed above average continued
to believe that their performance had been above average and that their
future performance on a similar task would similarly remain above
78
average. In fact, “the greater the subject’s apparent initial success, the
79
higher were the scores she estimated for past and future performances.”
Furthermore, when people draw causal connections among pieces of
80
information, the perseverance effect becomes even stronger. In a study
81
82
on debiasing, subjects were given case histories of two firefighters.
Each case history included information about the firefighter’s preference
83
for risk and his job performance. Some subjects were led to believe in a
positive relationship between risk preference and firefighting ability
(those with high risk preference were successful firemen, while those
with low risk preference were unsuccessful), while others were led to
believe in a negative relationship (those with high risk preference were
84
unsuccessful, while those with low risk preference were successful).
Subjects then wrote an explanation of the relationship about which they
85
had learned.
When later debriefed and told that the case histories were fictitious
and that there was no relationship between risk preference and success as
a firefighter, subjects continued to hold their initial beliefs: Those initially
told of a positive relationship tended to keep that belief, and those initially
told of a negative relationship were more likely to keep that belief, even in
86
the face of disconfirming evidence. More significantly, however, subjects
whose explanations referred to causal scenarios (that is, “firefighting is
risky, so people who prefer risk will be better firefighters”) displayed
more perseverance in their initial theories than those whose explanation
87
just restated the information in the case history.
When faced with information that might challenge their existing
schemas, this perseverance effect is so strong that people tend to devote
88
less attention to examining the contradictory information or ignore those
77. Id. at 884.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Anderson, supra note 71, at 127.
81. “Debiasing” is the correction or removal of bias. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans et al., Debiasing by
Instruction: The Case of Belief Bias, 6 Eur. J. Cognitive Psychol. 263, 264 (1994).
82. Anderson, supra note 71, at 127.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 127–28.
88. Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria
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89

inconsistencies or exceptions. This tendency is known as “confirmation
bias,” and it affects the ways in which people seek out and evaluate
90
information. Furthermore, due to a phenomenon known as “biased
assimilation,” when people evaluate new information, that evaluation is
influenced by the extent to which the information is consistent or
91
inconsistent with the person’s expectations about the information. In
other words, when “we come across evidence that supports our desired
conclusions, we may accept it at face value. But when we come across
comparable evidence that challenges our desired conclusions, we may
92
evaluate it more critically and work hard to refute it.”
In a study examining confirmation bias and biased assimilation,
opponents and proponents of capital punishment read about two studies:
One suggested that capital punishment was effective as a deterrent, and
93
the other suggested that it was not effective. Both opponents and
proponents of capital punishment thought the study that confirmed their
94
beliefs was more effective than the study that disconfirmed their beliefs.
In a similar study, researchers found that when examining evidence that
is incompatible with their prior beliefs, people invest greater effort in
evaluating the incompatible evidence than in evaluating any compatible
evidence, and they devote their efforts toward refuting arguments
95
challenging their own position.
Furthermore, attempting to prevent schema activation—or telling
people to disregard schemas—does not appear to diminish the effect of
96
schemas on decisionmaking. In a study examining this effect, Vicki
Smith attempted to prevent schema application by withholding from
97
jurors the name of the crime with which the defendant was charged.
Smith’s hypothesis was that without the retrieval cue (the name of the
crime), the subjects would not be able to access schemas about that crime
for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 568, 569 (1992).
89. Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 19 Advances in
Experimental Soc. Psychol. 41, 42 (1986).
90. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Psychology for Lawyers: Understanding
the Human Factors in Negotiation, Litigation, and Decision Making 15 (2012).
91. Id.
92. Kunda, supra note 33, at 230.
93. Each argument included a description of the design of the study and was followed by
criticisms of the study itself and rebuttals of those criticisms. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098, 2100–01 (1979).
94. Furthermore, the “net effect of exposing proponents and opponents of capital punishment to
identical evidence—studies ostensibly offering equivalent levels of support and disconfirmation—was
to increase further the gap between their views.” Id. at 2105.
95. This result is known as the “prior belief effect.” Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A
Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 5, 14 (1996).
96. Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 Law
& Hum. Behav. 507 (1993).
97. Id. at 532.
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and would instead have to rely on the jury instructions for guidance.
The results showed, however, that when jurors were not given the crime
name, they simply applied their own crime name and accessed their
99
schema for that crime. In the same study, Smith explicitly told jurors to
disregard their preexisting notions of the crime and to rely only on the
100
judge’s instructions. This did not work either. The instruction had no
effect on decisionmaking, and subjects relied on their preexisting
101
knowledge of the crime.
Finally, it seems that the perseverance effect may be biologically
102
based. In a 2005 study, researchers wanted to determine the extent to
which people pay attention to and assimilate evidence that is consistent
with their beliefs about the objects under consideration, and the extent to
103
which they treat inconsistent evidence as erroneous. Earlier studies in
behavioral and cognitive neuroscience indicated that different brain
104
networks are invoked during learning than during error detection and
105
conflict monitoring. The authors found that when people considered
evidence that was consistent with their beliefs, the brain regions associated
with learning and memory were significantly activated. When the evidence
was inconsistent with their beliefs, areas associated with error detection
106
and conflict resolution were activated. The authors concluded from this
that people’s beliefs and expectations may act as a “biological filter,”

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see Anderson, supra note 71. In his discussion of the results of the firefighter experiment,
Anderson noted that we could try to prevent jurors from creating causal explanations or theories, but
[s]uch a suggestion is as undesirable as it is impossible. Many of our theories are quite
useful, both as information organizers and as predictive tools. The problem lies not in our
propensity to create theories, but in our underestimation of how easy it is to create plausible
theories for any particular set of events we wish to explain.
Anderson, supra note 71, at 128.
102. Researchers have recently been able to expand the scope of the study of decisionmaking using
advanced functional brain imaging techniques, including functional magnetic resonance imaging
(“fMRI”). Using these new techniques, researchers can observe first-hand how the brain responds
during complex reasoning. Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience
Framework for Understanding Causal Reasoning and the Law, Law and the Brain 161 (Semir Zeki &
Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). In these studies, subjects typically participate in one task that involves
a specific reasoning process (deductive reasoning or analogical reasoning), and a second control task
that contains most of the same visual and cognitive stimulation, but not the specific reasoning process.
Researchers can then contrast the areas of the brain activated during the specific reasoning task and
the control task to measure unique brain activity associated with the specific reasoning task. Id.
Fugelsang and Dunbar approached their research slightly differently by using fMRI to examine the
areas of the brain that are activated when subjects are presented with evidence that is either consistent
or inconsistent with their own beliefs. Id.
103. Id. at 161.
104. Id. (citing various studies).
105. Id. (citing various studies).
106. Id. at 162.
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causing the person to employ learning mechanisms when confronted with
evidence consistent with their beliefs, and error detection mechanisms
107
when that evidence is inconsistent.
That jurors do not evaluate evidence in a vacuum will come as no
surprise to judges or lawyers or to anyone who has served on a jury. What
is perhaps surprising is that this inability to separate personal beliefs from
evidence is so pervasive and in fact has a neural signature. People,
therefore, may be unable to set aside beliefs and expectations when
making decisions or judgments. Furthermore, other findings have
demonstrated that people may be similarly unable to measure the extent
to which beliefs and expectations influenced their evaluation of statistical
108
evidence.
D. Expert v. Novice Schemas
In many cases, jurors have limited exposure to legal concepts
109
through television and movies and little actual legal knowledge. So
while these legal novices have schemas for ideas and concepts they have
110
encountered in the past, they will not typically have appropriate schemas
for any of the legal concepts or rules they will hear during a trial. This is in
contrast to the judge, lawyers, and often the parties, who will have more
developed schemas for the concepts in the trial. Generally, well-developed
schemas (expert schemas) tend to be more complex, better organized, and
therefore more accessible, allowing for more thoughtful judgment and
111
better decisionmaking.
Similarly, mature schemas are likely to be more complex and more
112
organized than immature ones. In a study investigating how conceptual
knowledge structures (or schemas) differ between novices and experts,
researchers compared the approaches of novices (first-year law students)

107. Id.
108. Id. at 163.
109. Of course, this is not always the case. In many states, even judges are required to sit on juries
when called, though they are sometimes granted hardship exemptions. Jean Guccione, More Judges
Answering Call for Jury Duty, L.A. Times, June 3, 2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jun/03/local/
me-6028. Most notably, Justice Elena Kagan was recently called for jury duty in D.C. Superior Court,
though her number was not called and she was released from service. Keith L. Alexander, Elena
Kagan Not Selected for Jury Duty, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/crimescene/keith-l-alexander/elena-kagan-reports-for-jury-d.html. This practice raises other issues of
“strong” jurors and their impact on juror decisionmaking that are beyond the scope of this Article.
110. Though they may have inappropriate schemas gleaned from television and other sources,
much has been made in the law and the media of this “CSI Effect.” See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel
Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 Stan.
L. Rev. 1335 (2009); Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About Forensic Science, The New
Yorker (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/05/07/070507fa_fact
_toobin.
111. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 173.
112. Id.
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and experts in civil law to two tasks: a card-sorting task and a concept113
elaboration task. The card-sorting task, which asked participants to sort
different cards into groups based on different legal concepts, was
designed to provide insight into “differences in the organisation of
114
conceptual knowledge of individuals at different levels of expertise.”
The concept-elaboration task, which asked participants to list everything
they knew about a particular topic in a short amount of time (two to
three minutes), was designed to provide insight into the participants’
depth of knowledge about the concepts and associations they made with
115
other concepts.
As expected, the experts’ schemas were highly developed and
elaborate, which allowed them to “effectively and efficiently interpret
116
information or problems that they [were] confronted with.” In contrast,
the novices, who lacked these developed mental frameworks for the law,
employed problem schemas that consisted of “loosely linked, incomplete,
117
and sometimes incorrect knowledge.” The novices’ schemas were also
less easily activated than the experts’, and—when activated—the novices’
118
schemas were less efficient at problem solving: “All other things being
equal, greater complexity moderates judgment. The more variety one has
encountered, the more complex the issues, the less clear-cut it all seems,
119
and the less extreme one’s judgment.”
Knowledge, therefore, becomes more structured and more accessible
120
with increasing expertise. When asked to group similar concepts in the
card-sorting task, experts used the same central legal concepts to create
clusters, while novices strung concepts together somewhat randomly and
121
reported no meaningful connections between the concepts. As a result of
this better organization, experts notice, recall, and use information that is
122
inconsistent with their schemas more than novices do, while the novices’
simpler, less-developed schemas limit them to more obvious, schema-

113. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1047.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1046.
117. Id.
118. Id. As expected, in the card-sorting task, experts used more central concepts when clustering
concepts, while novices ordered their concepts more randomly. Id. at 1055. In the concept-elaboration
task, experts used more legal definitions in their explanations of a particular concept, including
examples from cases, while novices used more everyday examples. Id. at 1056.
119. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 173–74.
120. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1058.
121. Id. This suggests that the schemas of novices, even when analyzing the same information, are
very different from each other. Individuals with greater expertise in law, however, have a more similar
knowledge base—and therefore more similar schemas—than those with less expertise. Id.
122. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 174.
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123

consistent material. Experts are therefore better able to moderate
124
inconsistencies and to make more focused judgments and decisions.

II. Why We Need to Go Beyond “Plain-Language” Instructions
Because most jurors have some prior knowledge of the law (and
because some may have quite a bit), they approach jury instructions with
an established schema in place—though it may not be a legally correct
schema—and their interpretation of the instructions they receive is
necessarily influenced by that schema. For example, when people in a
study were asked to list characteristics of robbery, 75% said that
“something of value is taken,” 73% said that the “perpetrator is armed,”
125
and 31% said that the crime “occurs in a home/apartment.” Robbery
does involve the taking of property from the victim by force or threat of
force, but it does not require that the property be valuable, that the
126
perpetrator be armed, or that the location be someone’s home.
An individual juror might therefore have a schema for robbery that
includes an armed perpetrator. Due to the perseverance effect, that
schema will influence the facts the juror notices and remembers when she
is presented with the evidence, and the schema will not always go away
when the juror enters the jury room to make a decision. This result occurs
even if—before she begins deliberations—the juror has been given plainly
127
written jury instructions that do not include an armed perpetrator. This
is especially true because the juror will not typically receive the
instructions containing the legally correct definition of robbery until after
she has seen—and likely already begun to evaluate—all of the evidence
in the case. That evidence will therefore have been viewed within the
context of her preexisting (and incorrect) schema for robbery.
Moreover, because the average juror has little experience in “the
law,” even plain-language instructions can contain unfamiliar terms, or
terms used in a way with which the juror has no experience. Thus the
juror faces an additional hurdle: She must first familiarize herself with
the “official” use of legal language before she can begin to interpret the
128
plain-language instructions she has been given. This is especially
difficult in law because precise language is so important. Judges and
lawyers share a common language gained through legal education and
practice, but jurors often lack that shared understanding and instead
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 857, 868 (1991).
126. Id. at 861.
127. Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 48 Am.
Psychologist 423, 429–30 (1993).
128. Lars Lindahl, Deduction and Justification in the Law: The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts,
17 Ratio Juris. 182, 182 (2004).
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incorporate their everyday knowledge and understanding of concepts
into their interpretation and application of legal rules to the facts of a
129
particular case.
Furthermore, some concepts in the law function as “intermediate”
concepts, which means that their meaning is flexible and determined by
130
the situation or the facts. For example, the legal term “ownership” has
a different meaning in the context of an inheritance (which obliges the
owner to pay inheritance taxes) than in the context of a bicycle received
from a friend as a gift (which does not oblige the owner to pay taxes).
The context (facts) determines the legal result and corresponding rights
and responsibilities. Moreover, the individual juror likely has a schema
for ownership that is different than either of these legal definitions.
Similarly, because jurors are presented with arguments from all sides of
an issue in an adversarial setting, the language and concepts they are
expected to understand are fluid, and can often be interpreted in
different ways. Schemas further compound this interpretative problem
because they influence the jury at every stage of the trial—from the
attention jurors give the evidence and how they interpret the information
they see at trial, to the way they interpret and apply the jury instructions
to that information.
While rewritten jury instructions have improved juror
comprehension, schema theory—and specifically the perseverance
effect—tells us that jurors will still apply existing schemas to those
131
rewritten instructions. Interestingly, there is little in the social science
literature examining the impact of schemas on jury decisionmaking when
jury instructions have been rewritten and made clearer. In one of the few
studies examining schemas and jury instructions, Smith concluded that
poor juror comprehension was not the result of poorly drafted instructions,
but the result of the jurors’ prior knowledge of the law and preexisting
132
knowledge frameworks (schemas) interfering with those instructions.
Jurors did not discard these frameworks when presented with conflicting
129. Dan Simon’s scholarship on cognitive coherence suggests that when jurors are asked to apply
instructions they cannot understand to a set of ambiguous facts, jurors will seek to impose coherence
on the complex task in front of them. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence
in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 517 (2004). In doing so, they will reduce the decision
to one of two alternatives, one of which is supported by strong considerations and one by weak
considerations. Id. at 516. “Coherence-based reasoning posits that the mind shuns cognitively complex
and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, confident
conclusions.” Id. at 513. In other words, instead of attempting to decipher confusing and complex
instructions, jurors will instead distill the complex decision into a simpler decision about which they
can feel more confident.
130. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1047.
131. See Diamond, supra note 127, at 429–30.
132. Smith, supra note 125, at 868. Smith argued that jurors have preexisting mental
representations of the elements of various crimes, but that those concepts do not include the correct
legal definitions of the crimes. Id. (robbery example).
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jury instructions, but instead relied on those frameworks when making a
133
decision. That study was later criticized by Peter English and Bruce
Sales, who argued that the study presented participants with standard
pattern jury instructions, instead of instructions that had been rewritten to
134
increase comprehension. English and Sales concluded that while jurors
may rely in part on schemas when given incomprehensible instructions, the
study did not show that jurors will do this when given instructions revised
135
according to psycholinguistic principles. In other words, given clear
instructions, they concluded, jurors might be more likely to follow the
136
law rather than their preexisting ideas.
Other researchers have used schemas to explain jury decisions, even
137
though juror comprehension of instructions was not controlled. In one
study, mock jurors given “not guilty by reason of insanity” instructions
were no more likely to convict or acquit than jurors told to rely on
138
common sense. The authors concluded that this was the result of the
jurors’ preconceived constructs or beliefs (schemas) about sanity and
139
insanity. These constructs, the authors felt, were very strong and often
more powerful than any new information the jurors might learn through
jury instructions. The authors suggested that drafters should pay attention
to these constructs and develop a new insanity test that incorporates both
psychological and legal definitions of insanity, as well as common sense
140
beliefs.
133. Id.
134. English & Sales, supra note 14, at 381.
135. Id. at 390.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe “Insanity”, 13 Law &
Hum. Behav. 41 (1989) [hereinafter Finkel & Handel, How Jurors]; Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F.
Handel, Jurors and Insanity: Do Test Instructions Instruct? 1 Forensic Rep. 65 (1988) [hereinafter
Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity].
138. Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity, supra note 137, at 76–77.
139. Id.
140. Finkel & Handel, How Jurors, supra note 137, at 44; Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity,
supra note 137, at 67. In a similar study, James Ogloff attempted to determine whether jurors used
preexisting schemas in determining what elements are important in a determination of legal insanity.
See generally James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision
Making, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 509 (1991). Participants were given one of two widely used insanity
instructions—the M’Naghten or the broader American Law Institute (“ALI”) insanity instructions.
Both standards had low juror comprehension rates (30.3% for the M’Naghten and 31.4% for the ALI
standards). Lieberman & Sales, supra note 3, at 620. The study showed, however, that the standard did
not affect the number of guilty versus not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdicts. Ogloff, supra, at 522.
Given the low comprehension rate, it appeared that instead of relying on the instructions, jurors used
schemas to identify elements important in determining insanity, but like the definition of robbery,
those schematic elements did not match the legal definition of insanity. Id. at 524. For example,
participants considered “expert psychiatric testimony” and “defendant’s intent to harm” as the most
important factors. Id. at 521 tbl.4. However, neither framework appears in either the M’Naghten or
ALI instructions. Furthermore, jurors who were not given any insanity instructions made similar
verdict choices to those given either set of instructions. Id. at 523. Ogloff recommended either
developing new standards consistent with jurors’ schemas about insanity, or rewriting the instructions

April 2013]

SCHEMAS IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

665

Finally, one study suggests that jurors will continue to adhere to
141
preexisting ideas (schemas) even when instructions are written clearly.
In that study, researchers compared rates of death sentence imposition
when “jurors were told that if the defendant were not sentenced to
death, he would spend an unspecified amount of time in prison or would
142
receive life without the possibility of parole” (“LWOP”). Although the
authors expected to find fewer death sentences when the LWOP condition
was present (because jurors could be certain that defendants would not go
free), the frequency of death sentences was almost identical in the two
143
conditions. Data from a manipulation check suggested that the LWOP
instruction was clear, but it appeared that jurors who were told the
defendant would receive LWOP relied on their preexisting beliefs that
144
LWOP did not really mean a life sentence. This prior belief was so
strongly held that jurors discounted even a clear jury instruction to the
145
contrary.
Of course, it is not surprising that even rewritten jury instructions
have a potential vulnerability. As Smith points out, colloquial “terms carry
colloquial baggage, some possibly correct, some incorrect. Wholesale
replacement of legal terms with simple language may activate a host of
associated concepts that are useful for everyday decisionmaking but are
146
legally incorrect or irrelevant.” In other words, even plain-language
instructions may contain terms that have different meanings to different
people, or contain everyday terms that have a specific legal meaning.

III. The Importance of the Representative Jury and Special Juries
as Models for Improvement
The term “American jury system” includes many distinct jury
systems. Each state, the federal government, and the District of Columbia
147
have their own courts, laws, practices, and multiple jury systems.
Moreover, jury systems differ in criminal cases and civil matters. All of
these systems, however, share some important characteristics. The Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution provides that in “all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

to make them more clear. Id. at 527.
141. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 788, 800 (2000) (discussing Shari S.
Diamond and Jonathan D. Casper’s unpublished study on understanding juries and their adherence to
preexisting schemas despite clear jury instructions).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 800–01.
146. Smith, supra note 125, at 869. Smith’s findings and conclusions were later criticized by Peter
English and Bruce Sales. See English & Sales, supra note 14.
147. Randolph N. Jonakait, The American Jury System 1 (2003).
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trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
148
have been committed . . . .” In civil cases in federal court, the right to a
jury trial is governed by the Seventh Amendment, which provides that in
“Suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
149
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” This
constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases only applies to federal
cases, but most states afford jury trials in civil matters for cases above the
150
level of the small claims court.
A fundamental feature of the trial by jury is the requirement that
the pool of potential jurors should be comprised of a reasonable cross
section of the community, or a “jury of peers.” Stemming from the
151
Magna Carta, this ancient notion continues to reverberate today and
has many goals, among them improving fact finding, reducing prejudice,
152
and promoting the legitimacy of the legal system. In 1968, the Supreme
Court noted that providing “an accused with the right to be tried by a
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
153
judge.” In practice, courts have often fallen short of this ideal. Women
and minorities have historically been excluded from juries and only
began serving in substantial numbers in the latter half of the twentieth
154
century. Moreover, until the second half of the twentieth century, jury
service was limited to land owners, further limiting the number of eligible
155
jurors.
Despite this shaky start, the country eventually moved toward a
156
representative jury, one “drawn from a cross-section of the community.”
This egalitarian tradition of a jury composed of a cross section of the
community argues against juries with special skills or special qualifications,
157
although there are examples of such “special juries.” A special jury is
one composed of citizens with relevant specialized knowledge that will
148. U.S. Const. amend VI. The Supreme Court has limited this right by holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee jury trials for “petty” offenses, or those carrying a potential
punishment of less than six months’ imprisonment. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970).
Since 1968 this constitutional right to a jury trial has applied to both state and federal criminal trials.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
149. U.S. Const. amend VII.
150. See Juries In-Depth: Right to a Jury Trial, Am. Judicature Soc’y, http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/
jc_right_overview.asp#criminal (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
151. The Magna Carta required that “charges against barons should be heard by other barons,
their ‘peers,’ rather than by the king.” Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 66.
152. Id. at 74–75.
153. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
154. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 66.
155. James Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special
Juries 176 (2006).
156. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
157. For an excellent discussion of the historical development and current status of the special
jury, see Oldham, supra note 155.
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help them to more efficiently solve the facts of a case. The earliest
known special jury convened in 1351, when a jury composed of cooks and
fishmongers was called to decide the case of a defendant charged with
159
selling bad food. Another well-known form of the special jury was the
“jury of matrons,” all-woman juries assembled in cases in which a
convicted woman awaiting execution “pleaded her belly,” or claimed to
160
be pregnant. The jury of matrons determined the truth of the claim and
decided whether the execution should be stayed until the child was
161
born.
The idea of using experts to resolve disputes has an extensive history
in the United States. Arbitrators are perhaps the best-known example, but
experts also make decisions as administrative judges and in specialty
162
courts. There is also a large body of legal literature discussing the
constitutionality of dispensing with the jury in complex civil litigation and
163
instead employing special juries. Although at one time about half of the
states had some form of special jury statute, today only Delaware has a
specific statute allowing for special juries in complex civil cases, although
even there it has become exceedingly rare to call a special jury as many
164
special jury requests are rejected due to insufficient complexity. Even a
Delaware court noted that special juries are “contrary to fundamental
concepts of jury trial and would substitute a method of selection which is
165
inconsistent with established principles of justice.”
As James Oldham notes, the “idea of drawing exclusive special
juries from specialized lists seems to be anachronistic today. Elite special
juries surely are antithetical to the hard-fought, long-delayed goal of
166
opening up jury service to everyone.” Oldham argues that there is still a
place for special juries, however, and that while the cross section
requirement meets the goal of keeping citizens involved “in the business of
democracy,” the special jury serves equally compelling goals, such as
167
dealing effectively with complex cases. However, he concedes that, for

158. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 68.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (noting that, while the use of special juries was fairly common in England in the 1700s,
their use declined and was abolished in 1949).
162. Oldham, supra note 155, at 196. Neither private arbitrators nor administrative judges must
submit questions of fact to a jury, though specialty courts still must do so. Id.
163. See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 43, 80 (1980); Kenneth S. Klein,
The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 1005,
1007 (1992).
164. Oldham, supra note 155, at 199.
165. Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., Inc., 1989 WL 70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989).
166. Oldham, supra note 155, at 177.
167. Id.
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the most part, the argument that a “complexity exception” can be read
168
into the Seventh Amendment has not succeeded.
In addition to the constitutional hurdles, specialized juries composed
of experts are contrary to ideals of a representative jury of peers and may
not promote more accurate fact finding. The representative jury is based
on the premise that the ordinary citizen is capable of sorting out the details
of most lawsuits. As Vidmar and Hans note, the “idea of a representative
jury is a compelling one. A jury of people with a wide range of
backgrounds, life experiences, and world knowledge will promote accurate
169
fact-finding.” Diverse groups are likely to hold diverse perspectives on
170
the evidence, thereby encouraging more thorough debate. Moreover,
171
research suggests that diverse juries are better fact finders.
Abandoning the representative jury system in favor of a system of
special juries of experts is an extreme solution, and one that is unlikely to
find broad support in the courts. Furthermore, there are great benefits to
a representative jury that would be lost in such a system. A compromise
position, therefore, is a representative system that attempts to better
educate lay jurors to make them more like experts, but without
abandoning the many benefits those lay jurors bring to the evaluation of
evidence. We can come closer to achieving this ideal by attempting to
correct and develop the schemas jurors bring with them to trials in order to
make their decisionmaking processes more efficient, flexible, and legally
accurate.

IV. Recommendations: How to Correct Old Schemas and
Create New Ones
Findings in social science suggest that jurors bring existing schemas
for legal concepts to trials, many of which may be incorrect or
172
undeveloped. Furthermore, jurors are not typically aware of the extent
to which these schemas can influence their decisionmaking. Because—
plain or not—jurors cannot separate schemas from their use of jury
instructions, the goal of jury instructions should be two-fold: first, to give
jurors the applicable law, and second, to help jurors correct existing
schemas and develop new and legally correct schemas before they are
exposed to the evidence in a trial.
168. Id. at 196. Of course, the complexity exception is not without its supporters. Notably, Judge
Richard Posner has stated that he would favor a complexity exception in certain “complex commercial
cases.” Jeffrey Cole, Economics of Law: An Interview with Judge Posner, 22 Litig. 23, 66 (1995). He
noted: “It’s unfair really to put people through the task of trying to understand a subject which people
of higher education and intellectual attainment spend a lifetime studying with imperfect
understanding.” Id. at 67.
169. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 74.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 74–75 (citing various studies).
172. Smith, supra note 125, at 868.
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This approach does not envision a system in which we attempt to turn
jurors into something approximating attorneys, a feat that would be both
impossible given the time frame and contrary to our system of a
representative jury. Furthermore, some studies suggest that as attorneys
gain experience, they actually become worse at evaluating cases because
they become so rooted in their own preconceptions—or schemas—for
173
what the law is and should be. Instead, these reworked instructions
should try to create schemas in jurors that function more like those of
experts in that they are better organized, and therefore more accessible,
allowing for more thoughtful judgment and better decisionmaking. In
this way, we can capture the advantages and ideals of the lay juror, while
at the same time ensuring more accurate, consistent, and legally
appropriate decisionmaking.
We do not—and should not—expect jurors to entirely remove past
experience and common sense from the equation when making decisions
about verdicts. While jurors might have traditionally been seen as “blank
slates” who could simply be instructed to base their decisions solely on
the permissible evidence and the appropriate legal standard, the social
174
175
science research on both jurors and other human decisionmakers does
not support this view.
In fact, we instruct jurors to take past experiences into account in
certain contexts. For example, jurors are told to use common sense in
176
judging the credibility of witnesses, and the doctrine of jury nullification
allows jurors to acquit criminal defendants who are technically guilty when
the jury feels the law is either immoral or wrongly applied to the
177
defendant. Moreover, studies of jury behavior indicate that preexisting
178
beliefs often play a role in the jury deliberation process. However,
because many jurors have undeveloped or incorrect schemas for the legal
concepts they will be asked to apply in a trial, we should correct jurors’
173. Randall Kiser, Beyond Right and Wrong: The Power of Effective Decision Making for
Attorneys and Clients 22 (2010) (citing various studies). Indeed, Kiser notes that attorneys, like
other highly successful people, “deflect criticism, rarely change their opinions, [and] resist
feedback . . . . [They] lack self-awareness and resist behavioral changes required to improve their
problem-solving skills.” Id. at 285.
174. See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 13, at 519.
175. See, e.g., Paul T. P. Wong & Bernard Weiner, When People Ask “Why” Questions, and the
Heuristics of Attributional Search, 40 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 650, 661–62 (1981).
176. See, e.g., 2.260 Credibility of Witnesses, Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions
(2009) (instructing jurors to “look at all the evidence, drawing on your own common sense and
experience of life”).
177. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 227. As James Oldham describes the process of jury
nullification, the doctrine stems from the idea that the “the jury should have the power to decide the
law by ignoring it.” Oldham, supra note 155, at 25.
178. Vicki L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People's
Prior Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 517, 528–29 (1996)
(finding that jurors’ prior knowledge about the elements of crimes influences information processing
and decisionmaking).
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misunderstandings about the law and create legally appropriate and
accurate schemas before jurors are told about the facts of the case. To do
this, we need to efficiently train jurors to use the law and facts, and
educational psychology can help inform this effort. Additionally, we can
help jurors overcome the schema-perseverance effect and reduce bias by
asking them to be aware of their own decisionmaking processes.
A. Developing Jurors’ Schemas to Make Them Legally Accurate
One of the goals of jury instructions should be to develop novice
jurors’ schemas for the legal concepts they are about to apply to the facts
during the trial. We can increase efficient learning in several ways, both
by giving jurors simple and straightforward explanations of the legal
concepts they will be asked to apply, and by allowing jurors to study
worked examples of those legal concepts and build new schemas before
they are asked to interpret law and facts. In turn, these schemas will be
more structured and more accessible to the jurors during the trial and
during deliberations, leading to better judgment and better outcomes.
Juror schema development and learning must be efficient—not only
because the nature of a trial does not allow for drawn-out juror
education—but also because efficient learning leads to better learning
179
outcomes with less mental effort. All human learning relies on both
180
working memory and long-term memory. When people are in learning
mode, new information is processed in the working memory and forms
181
schemas that are then stored in long-term memory. Working memory is
mainly a storage place for conscious processing; it does not have the
182
capacity to store more than limited amounts of information. If we ask
jurors to learn too much too quickly (that is, all of the law and the facts
they are being asked to interpret), we will overwhelm their working
183
memory and shut down new learning. This is especially true because, as
novices, jurors have fewer developed schemas for the concepts they are
learning, and they can easily be overwhelmed with the cognitive demands
184
of building new schemas.
To help jurors counteract inappropriate preexisting schemas and
activate legally appropriate ones, we should provide them with pre-trial
explanations of the applicable law. Traditionally, the only instruction that
jurors receive on the applicable law are the jury instructions themselves,
and typical instructions are taken from statutes or cases; even pattern jury

179. Ruth Clark et al., Efficiency in Learning: Evidence-Based Guidelines to Manage
Cognitive Load 27 (2006).
180. Id. at 28.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 29.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 32.
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instructions, intended to be clearer and more accessible for the average
layperson, are still written by lawyers—experts—in language that makes
185
sense to experts. But experts and novices do not deal with new
information or learn in the same way, and when experts serve as
instructors, “they often overload their learners by failing to compensate for
186
the much more limited schemas of the learners.” Because the novice
does not have relevant schemas for the law, the pre-trial explanation
should serve the role that existing schemas would serve for the expert, or
187
the lawyers and judges.
Moreover, this explanation should move beyond the jury instructions
themselves and give new jurors a brief, introductory overview of the legal
issues. The explanation should incorporate strategies for teaching novice
learners—including tactics like organizing sentences that preview and then
review the content of the explanation, definitions and examples of
unfamiliar terms, explicit statements that require minimal inferences, and
188
headers to signal paragraph topics. These “pre-instructions” will help
give jurors an overview of the applicable law and help them redefine and
better develop their schemas for the issues they are about to examine
during the trial. As a result, jurors’ schemas will be more accessible, and
jurors will be more flexible in their thinking and less swayed by
unconscious biases.
Furthermore, novices will learn more efficiently if they are given
worked examples or a step-by-step explanation of the solution to a
189
problem that help them build new schemas. Because novices lack

185. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012); Tiersma, supra note 7, at 1088.
186. Clark et al., supra note 179, at 33.
187. Id. at 251.
188. Id. at 259.
189. Id. at 32, 190. In fact, some states do include examples in some types of jury instructions. For
example, the state of Connecticut explains the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence
this way:
Circumstantial evidence of an event is the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of
certain facts or evidence or the happening of other events from which you may logically
conclude that the event in question did happen. By way of example, let us assume that it is a
December night and you’re preparing to retire for the evening. You look out the window
and you see it is snowing. You wake up the next morning, come to court, and testify that the
night before it was snowing in the area of your house. That is direct evidence of the fact that
it snowed the night before. You saw it and you came into court and testified to that fact.
Now assume that it is another December night, the weather is clear, there is no snow on
the ground, and you retire for the evening. You wake up the next morning, you look out the
window and you see snow on the ground and footprints across your lawn. You come into
court and you testify to those facts. The evidence that the night before there was no snow on
the ground and the next morning there was snow on the ground and footprints across your
lawn is direct evidence. That direct evidence, however, is circumstantial evidence of the fact
that some time during the night it snowed and that some time thereafter someone walked
across your lawn.
Criminal Jury Instructions: 2.4-1 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, State of Conn. Judicial Branch
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schemas for new concepts, they need learning environments that
compensate for that deficiency; this type of learning environment would
provide schema substitutes by optimizing jurors’ limited working
memories in ways that free working memory for learning. The use of
examples is especially helpful for novice learners—like the average juror—
who know little about the legal issue they are being asked to analyze
because the examples will help them develop schemas and accelerate
190
expertise. If jurors have a worked example to study just prior to solving
a similar problem (that is, the problem of how the law applies to the
particular facts in a trial), this will give them an analogy to use when
solving the problem, thus freeing up more working memory capacity for
191
schema development.
The Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 501 for “Proximate Cause” is
an example of a pattern jury instruction that could be rewritten to include
both an introductory explanation to the legal issue, as well as worked
examples of how the law would apply to a particular set of facts. The
instruction states: “The law frequently uses the expression ‘proximate
cause,’ with which you may not be familiar. When I use the expression
‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, produces damage and without which the damage would not
192
have occurred.”
Of course, “proximate” and “cause” are words that are familiar to
most jurors, but the term “proximate cause” has a legal definition that is
much different than its common usage. The legal concept of proximate
cause is really one of policy and whether there is enough of a connection
between the act and the harm that it is fair to hold the defendant liable
for the harm: To satisfy proximate cause, it must have been reasonably
193
foreseeable that the harm would result from the action. Because of this
(June 13, 2008), http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.4-1.htm. This is likely to be more helpful to a
juror than the Ninth Circuit’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which provide:
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as
testimony by a witness about what that witness personally saw or heard or did.
Circumstantial evidence is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another
fact. You should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the
weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide how
much weight to give to any evidence.
3.8 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions (Mar. 2006),
http://archive.ca9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/0/daf5c7758d60a2ed882564b4000844cf?OpenDocument.
Comments to the pattern jury instruction do note that it may be helpful to include an illustrative
example. Id.
190. Clark et al., supra note 179, at 193–94, 201.
191. Id. at 193.
192. 501 Proximate Cause—Concurring Proximate Cause—Definition, Arkansas Model Jury
Instructions—Civil (updated Nov. 2011).
193. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928) (“[B]ecause of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond
a certain point.”).
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difference between its common usage and its legal usage, jurors will
likely need a corrected schema for this term, and examples of how the
term plays out in the legal context will be helpful in creating a legally
appropriate schema for “proximate cause.” Jurors should be told the rule
and the reasoning for the proximate cause requirement and given an
example of how the rule can be used to solve a specific problem before
they are told about the facts of the present case. Here is a hypothetical:
Rule and reasoning for “proximate cause”: The next requirement for
negligence is that the defendant’s action be the “proximate cause” of
the plaintiff’s injury. Proximate cause means that at the time he took
the action, the defendant must have been reasonably able to predict
that the harm to the plaintiff would result from his action; in other
words, the harm must have been reasonably foreseeable. This
requirement is in addition to the requirement that the defendant’s
actions be the “cause in fact” of the plaintiff’s injury (see previous
instruction on “cause in fact”). We have this requirement because we
do not think it is fair to hold people liable for every consequence of
their actions, if that consequence is too improbable or far-reaching.
You should find proximate cause in the following example: If Margot
throws a book at Steve’s head, it is reasonably foreseeable that
Margot’s action could proximately cause Steve harm. Furthermore, if
Margot throws a book at Steve’s head, but it misses and knocks an
object off of the shelf, which then hits Steve in the head, it is also
reasonably foreseeable that Margot’s action could proximately cause
Steve harm. Therefore, in both situations, when Margot threw the
book, she proximately caused Steve’s harm.
You should NOT find proximate cause in the following example:
Margot, driving carelessly, crashes into Steve’s car. Margot didn’t know
that the car contained a bomb, which exploded when she hit it. Several
blocks away, a mother carrying her baby, Chad, is startled by the
explosion and drops Chad. In this situation, Chad cannot recover
against Margot because Chad’s injury is so removed from Margot’s
action that her harm was not reasonably foreseeable. Margot’s action
was not the proximate cause of Chad’s injury. Note that in this example
Margot has been negligent (because she was driving carelessly), and
her careless driving is the “cause in fact” of Chad’s injury (because if
she hadn’t been negligent, the crash and the explosion would not have
occurred). However, we do not want to hold Margot liable for Chad’s
injury because it is so improbable and far-reaching that it would not be
194
fair.

As noted above, this explanation should be given before the
presentation of evidence. Because jury instructions are typically given
after the presentation of evidence and just prior to deliberation, jurors
have already had the evidence framed for them and have already been
195
primed to view it in a particular (or several different) ways. These
194. See generally id.; see also Steven L. Emanuel, Emanuel Law Outlines: Torts 148–49 (8th
ed. 2009).
195. See discussion on priming and framing supra Part I.B.
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primes and frames activate schemas that, as noted above, may or may not
be legally correct or appropriate. In many cases, they are likely activating
schemas in jurors that include misconceptions about the law and, once
activated, these schemas will persevere throughout the trial and into
deliberations. If courts incorporated a more neutral, pre-trial explanation
of the law, this neutral and legally correct information would also have a
priming and framing effect, creating and activating appropriate schemas
and allowing jurors to better weigh the evidence from both sides.
Judges have discretion to determine the timing of jury instructions,
and some judges give jurors instructions before the presentation of
evidence so that jurors will have some prior understanding of the law they
196
will later be asked to apply. Research on schema theory supports this
approach: People are more likely to remember information relevant to
197
schemas, and—as a result of both priming and framing—context affects
198
people’s interpretations of new information. This suggests that learning
about the law before the evidence is presented should give jurors
appropriate schemas for processing the evidence and enhance their
ability to identify and remember relevant facts.
This pre-trial timing of instructions is supported by research into the
efficacy of jury instructions. One study found that subjects who heard the
law both before and after the presentation of evidence were better able to
199
apply the law to the facts of the case than other subjects. Furthermore,
pre-instruction had no apparent downside: “There were no decrements in
their abilities to recall the evidence, understand the law, or make verdict
decisions. It appears, then, that these benefits of pre[-]instruction may be
realized without cost to jurors’ information processing or decision
200
making.” Moreover, some research suggests that jurors who hear

196. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012). Appellate courts have consistently left decisions about the use
and content of pre-trial instructions to the discretion of the trial court judge. See, e.g., United States v.
Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Valenzuela, 142 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App.
1977). Some appellate opinions encourage the use of pre-trial instruction. See Valenzuela, 142 Cal.
Rptr. at 658 (“[W]e commend the astute judge who tries to give the jury advance notice of the law
applicable to the case. . . . However, as we see it, the purpose of preinstructing jurors is not to avoid
the necessity of instructing at the close of argument; rather, it is to give them some advance
understanding of the applicable principles of law so that they will not receive the evidence and
arguments in a vacuum.”). Others advise against it. See, e.g., People v. Murillo, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 24
(Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the preferable method is to give the jury instructions after the close of
evidence but before closing arguments, while acknowledging that the trial court has discretion on this
matter).
197. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 45, at 98.
198. See generally supra Part I.B.
199. The author of the study notes, however, that this result cannot be seen as a pure effect of pretrial instruction because the group that only received pre-instructions (and no post-instructions) did
not show this improvement, but the results do indicate that there is benefit in hearing the instructions
twice. Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision
Making, 76 J. Applied Psychol. 220, 226 (1991).
200. Id.
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instructions twice—both before and after the presentation of evidence—
have better comprehension than jurors who only hear the instructions
201
once. Furthermore, instructions could still be repeated at the close of
evidence and jurors could still be given copies of both the written
instructions and the pre-trial explanations to take with them into
deliberations.
B. Helping Jurors Reduce Schema Perseverance
Jurors should also be explicitly told to consider the evidence from
both sides as a means of reducing schema perseverance and bias.
Although studies have found that demanding that someone be accurate
and fair does not guarantee that a person will follow that instruction,
telling people to consider the evidence from both sides might have that
effect. For example, one study found that instructions to be “as objective
and unbiased as possible” in reviewing studies on capital punishment did
202
not in fact reduce bias. However, when subjects were explicitly told to
203
consider the new evidence from both points of view, bias was reduced.
In other words, if we ask people to monitor their cognitive processes by
thinking carefully about how they are evaluating evidence and paying
attention to biases, it seems that we can reduce the impact of bias and
204
preexisting schemas on decisionmaking. Because most jurors are
largely unaware of the impact of schemas on decisionmaking, telling
jurors about schemas and their potential biasing effects before they
evaluate any evidence might also help to ameliorate the effect of schemas
205
on juror decisionmaking.
Furthermore, by asking people to be more aware of the ways in
which schemas—and specifically priming and framing—influence
decisionmaking, we can, through greater awareness of these typically
unconscious phenomena, recognize the effect and reduce the impact of
206
schemas on decisionmaking. For example, although we cannot avoid
viewing problems through frames, “with effort you can become aware of
207
how you are framing a situation and whether there are alternatives.”
To do this, people need to become aware of the origins of their frames,
as well as how others in the same situation might frame the same issue or
problem. Similarly, if decisionmakers become more aware of their own
201. Elwork et al., supra note 1, at 177–78.
202. Charles G. Lord et al., Consider the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment,
47 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1231, 1233, 1237 (1984).
203. Id. at 1234.
204. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 172–73.
205. Id.
206. Robbenholt & Sternlight, supra note 90, at 13 (“It can be helpful to acknowledge the reality
that preexisting knowledge structures can influence perception and to actively question the basis for a
particular understanding.”).
207. Brest & Krieger, supra note 25, at 36.
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decisionmaking process, this could have an impact on their susceptibility
208
to primes. Moreover, priming might also be counteracted through
209
instructions that encourage feelings of accountability by jurors.
We should also ask jurors to try to create plausible explanations for
both—or all—sides before coming to a decision. This could reduce
unwarranted theory perseverance by showing jurors how easily either
210
side might be right, or how either theory might be true. In a follow-up
211
to the firefighter study discussed in Part I, Anderson found that if
people are compelled to explain why their theory might be wrong, the
212
perseverance effect was moderated: “[I]nducing people to create causal
explanations of opposite social theories produces more flexible and
213
appropriate responses to challenges to those theories.” Subjects who
explained both a positive and a negative relationship between firefighting
ability and risk preference were significantly less reluctant to abandon
214
their initial theory when told that their case history was fictitious. Asking
jurors to describe “potential alternative hypotheses before the
presentation of evidence may minimize the influence of specific beliefs on
215
the part of the individual asked to weigh the evidence.” In other words, if
jurors are asked to articulate theories for both sides before reaching a final
decision, theory perseverance and thoughtless schema application could be
minimized.

Conclusion
Schemas are powerful—though largely unconscious—frameworks
that influence the way people see, interpret, and remember information.
Like any other person interpreting a set of facts, jurors cannot help but
be influenced by schemas when interpreting facts and applying the law
during a trial. Furthermore, although the law has made great strides in
improving juror comprehension of jury instructions, even “plain-language”

208. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First
Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 Or. L. Rev. 305, 349 (2010).
209. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and
Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 Pers. & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 563, 568 (1998).
Some subjects in an anger priming experiment were told that an “expert” would interview them at the
end of the study to assess their responses and reasoning. Id. at 566. Those subjects reported that they
engaged in a more deliberative decisionmaking process than that of those who were not accountable
for their reasoning. Id. at 571.
210. Anderson, supra note 71, at 129. Anderson warns, however, that these procedures might not
be as effective when the theory involved has a strong emotional component, such as a person’s beliefs
concerning the deterrent effect of capital punishment, because that emotional component might
prevent people from considering competing theories even when explicitly instructed to do so. Id. at 136.
211. Id. at 127.
212. Id. at 134.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Fugelsang & Dunbar, supra note 102, at 163.

April 2013]

SCHEMAS IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

677

instructions are vulnerable to the interpretive influence of schemas. Jurors’
understanding of the law is typically undeveloped, and therefore their
schemas for legal concepts are often correspondingly incorrect or
undeveloped. Moreover, although they may not be correct in their
assumptions about the law, jurors do not come to trials as blank slates—
they bring with them existing schemas that shape the way they view both
the law and the facts that are often garnered from the media and popular
entertainment.
For this reason, existing jury instructions, which are typically given
to jurors after the presentation of evidence, do little to counteract or
correct jurors’ undeveloped or misinformed schemas. Based on findings
from the social sciences, lawyers and judges should attempt to develop
jurors’ schemas for the relevant legal concepts to make them better
organized and more accessible, allowing for more thoughtful judgment
and more accurate decisionmaking. To accomplish this, jurors should be
provided with both well-written jury instructions and pre-trial explanations
of the applicable law, including examples of how the law applies and to
which they can analogize the facts of the present case. We should also help
jurors to overcome schema perseverance by asking them to consider the
evidence from both sides and to attempt to create plausible explanations
for both sides of a case. These steps will help counteract inappropriate
preexisting schemas, activate legally appropriate schemas, and result in
better decisionmaking by jurors.
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